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A Re.-Examination of Fair Trade
Legislation in the Context of the New
Ohio Fair Trade Act and the Decision
in Hudson Distribs., Inc. v. Upjohn Co.
James A. Gorrell and Herbert R. Brown*
In two recent cases,' the Ohio Supreme Court considered the consti-
tutional validity and the effect of the provisions of the new Ohio Fair
Trade Act.' The court followed the decision of the Virginia Supreme
Court in Standard Drug Co. v. General Elec. Co.,3 which upheld the
constitutionality of a somewhat similar law enacted by the Virginia legis-
lature a year earlier than the Ohio General Assembly's action on the new
Ohio Fair Trade Act. Because the Ohio Supreme Court recognized the
Virginia holding, considerable
T1m AurHoRs, James A. Gorrell (B.S., LB., comment has resulted among
Harvard University) and Herbert R. Brown lawyers and businessmen in-
(A.B., Denison University, LL.B., University of terested in the "new-type" fair
Michigan) are practicing attorneys in Colum- trade theory embodied in the
bus, Ohio.
Ohio and Virginia laws.
Fair trade legislation has
been the center of both economic and legal controversy for several dec-
ades. In particular, the wisdom as well as the constitutional validity of
the concept upon which such legislation is predicated has been ques-
tioned.4 In Ohio, the legal problem is further complicated by the fact
* The authors of this article cannot lay claim to being particularly unbiased in this matter.
They were involved in the drafting of the original legislation when it was introduced into the
Ohio General Assembly and have been involved in defending its constitutionality in most of
the litigation arising out of that legislation since it was passed. Therefore, the reader is
warned that they are committed to the fair trade principle, and despite all attempts to attain
some objectivity, this bias exists and perhaps will become apparent to the reader of this article.
1. Hudson Distribs., Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 174 Ohio St. 487, 190 N.E.2d 460 (1963). (Con-
solidated with Hudson Distribs., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.)
2. Omo REV. CODE §§ 1333.27-.34.
3. 202 Va. 367, 117 S.E.2d 289 (1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 4 (1961).
4. The basis upon which the supreme court affirmed the validity of the Ohio Fair Trade
Act in the Hudson case was stated in the opinion of Judge Griffith as follows:
A. The new legislation is justified by section 2, article XII of the Ohio Constitution,
which permits the General Assembly to pass laws regulating the sale and conveyance of per-
sonal property.
B. The operation of the act is restricted to items in free and open competition.
C. The new act is based upon a contractual relationship, the consideration for which is
the use of a manufacturer's trademark or tradename, in which the court recognized the exist-
ence of property rights.
D. There is no compulsion upon a retailer to handle trademarked goods and, therefore,
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that the recent supreme court decision which found the Fair Trade Act
constitutional in Ohio carried the affirmative votes of only three out of
the seven supreme court justices. Under the peculiar provisions of the
Ohio Constitution,5 however, this vote was sufficient to sustain the valid-
ity of the act because the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County had
held the provisions of -the Fair Trade Act constitutional in a two-to-one
decision.' Accordingly, the Ohio Supreme Court was governed by the
constitutional provision which states:
No law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the supreme court
without the concurrence of at least all but one of the judges, except in
the affirmance of a judgment of a court of appeals declaring a law un-
constitutional and void.7
A proper understanding of the new Ohio Fair Trade Act requires
consideration of the history and purposes behind its enactment, study of
the developments which have taken place subsequent to the recent su-
preme court decision, and an appreciation of the concept behind the
"fair-trade" movement in the United States.
State fair trade laws and the "quality stabilization act" (as the proposed
federal legislation now before Congress is called) are concerned basically
with establishing the validity of resale price maintenance contracts be-
tween manufacturers and their distributors. Fundamentally, the ques-
tions raised by this legislation are economic in nature and involve com-
peting economic interests. On the one hand, the manufacturer seeks to
protect his channels of distribution and preserve the property rights which
he has established in the good will of his trade names and trademarks.
On the other hand, the distributor who buys a product will claim a right
to the unrestricted use of the product. Supposedly, the public is inter-
ested in paying the lowest possible prices on the products they purchase.
At common law, both in this country and in England, resale price
maintenance contracts generally were held valid and reasonable.' Then,
the operation of the act upon any retailer comes about by virure of the retailer's voluntary
choice.
E. Conditions and contractual burdens imposed through legislation are not new and
have ample precedence in the judicial decisions of this state.
F. The economic arguments with respect to whether or not price-cutting by retail deal-
ers is injurious to the general welfare and detrimental to the small merchant is a matter of
legislative consideration which was resolved by the Ohio General Assembly.
5. OHo CoNr. art. IV, 5 2.
6. See Hudson Distribs., Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 117 Ohio App. 207 (1961). The case arose
in Cuyahoga County, Ohio.
7. OHiO CONST. art. IV, 5 2.
8. Gragan v. Chafee, 156 Cal. 611, 105 Pac. 745 (1909); Commonwealth v. Grinstead, 111
Ky. 203, 63 S.W. 427 (1901); Garst v. Charles, 187 Mass. 144, 72 N.E. 839 (1905); Garst
v. Harris, 177 Mass. 72, 58 N.E. 174 (1900); Walsh v. Dwight, 40 App. Div. 513, 58 N.Y.S.
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in the 1911 case of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park,' the United States
Supreme Court held that such resale price maintenance contracts were
invalid under the Sherman Antitrust Act."° Following this decision, a
period of approximately twenty years passed during which price-cutting
went untrammeled throughout the United States. But certain factors
convinced many state legislatures that such unrestrained competition was
neither a blessing for the consumer nor for the manufacturer. Affected
were certain manufacturers' trademarks, trade names, and their channels
of distribution. Furthermore, the unchecked price-cutting adversely af-
fected the small merchant. This was particularly true when the Great
Depression occurred. California made the first real effort to re-establish
the protection of the much-abused manufacturer's trademark and good
will by passing California Statute chapter 278, section 1, the first of the
state fair trade laws. This act, of course, applied only to intrastate com-
merce because of the effect of the Dr. Miles case and its interpretation
of the application of the Sherman Act to interstate commerce.
As a reaction to the Dr. Miles case, the United States Congress en-
acted the Miller-Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Act." Supposedly,
it was the legislative step necessary to permit enactment of state fair trade
laws to protect the owners of trademarks and trade names, even though
such laws affected interstate commerce. The subsequent federal Mc-
Guire Act 2 clarified the extent to which state fair trade legislation ap-
plied. It specifically authorized the application of state fair trade provi-
sions to non-signers of fair trade contracts. As a result of this so-called
"enabling legislation," state fair trade laws were exempted from the oper-
ation of the Sherman Act. Since that time not a single state fair trade
law has been challenged successfully as a violation of any of the federal
antitrust laws.
A total of forty-six of the fifty states have adopted fair trade statutes
since the initial California fair trade act of 1931, now the California
Business and Professional Code section 16902. Two states, Ohio, in
the new Ohio Fair Trade Act, and Virginia, in its new fair trade law,
rejected the old non-signer provision which was originally contained in
the California act. Instead, the Ohio and Virginia legislatures have based
their statutes on purely contractual principles. The purpose of this article
is to re-examine fair trade, particularly the type of fair trade legislation
embodied in the new Ohio act. The history of the new Ohio act and
91 (1898). The English rule was the same. See Elliman Sons & Co. v. Carrington & Son,
Ltd., [19011 2 Ch. D. 275. See generally CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION & TRADEMARKS
§ 22.2 (2d ed. 1950).
9. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
.10. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958).
11. Ibid.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)-(5) (1958).
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its subsequent judicial interpretation in the Ohio courts will be of ex-
treme importance to this examination.
WHY FAIR TRADE?
The need for fair trade legislation grew out of the national distribu-
tion of consumer goods identified by the brand or trademark of the pro-
ducer or distributor. Slightly more than a generation ago most con-
sumer goods were sold in bulk. The country store, the neighborhood
grocer, and the family pharmacist purchased, displayed, and sold com-
modities in bulk. It is easy for those of us who have reached middle age
to recall the barrels of pickles, the flat cylinders of cheese, the tubs of
loose candy, and the barrels of crackers from which bulk merchandise
was sold. In purchasing goods from such containers, consumers relied
upon the reputation and integrity of the storekeeper. They neither knew
nor cared about the identity of the producer or manufacturer.
As the facilities for mass national communications developed, na-
tional advertising became prevalent. The producers of consumer goods
developed techniques for the national distribution of their products. To
identify certain goods with their producer, brands or trademarks were
affixed to the packages and used in advertising. Instead of the cracker
barrel and cylinder of cheese, these products were identified as "Nabisco"
crackers, "Heinz" pickles, and "Kraft" cheese. Thus, the reputation of
the producer for producing desirable goods was symbolized in the mind
of the consumer by the trademark.
It is axiomatic that a good reputation is difficult to build but easy to
destroy. The good reputation of a consumer goods manufacturer be-
comes a reservoir of good will with consumers. Such good will is created
by producing desirable products, making them available to consumers,
and publicizing them. The trademark which a producer uses to identify
the source of the goods is the symbol of the producer's good will.
A producer retains a proprietary interest in his good will or good repu-
tation with consumers. This is his most valuable asset. The new Ohio
Fair Trade Act simply affords a means of protecting this proprietary in-
terest against damage or destruction by those seeking to use this interest
for their own purposes, contrary to the conditions imposed thereon by
the owner.
Basic to the theory of the new Ohio Fair Trade Act is the fact that
in the sale of branded goods two distinct and identifiable proprietary in-
terests exist: (1) the interest of the producer as the proprietor of his good
will, and (2) the interest of the owner of the goods. The producer does
not part with his proprietary interest in his good will when he sells the
goods. It is a protectible interest. Recognition of this fundamental prin-
ciple is the basis of all trademark law. As Mr. Justice Clifford said in
McLean v. Fleming:
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Everywhere courts of justice proceed upon the ground that a party
has a valuable interest in the goodwill of his trade, and in the labels
or trademark which he adopts to enlarge and perpetuate it. Hence
it is held that he, as proprietor, is entitled to protection as against
one who attempts to deprive him of the benefits resulting from the
same, by using his label and trademark without his consent and au-
thority.13
Mr. Justice Holmes recognized the continuing proprietary interest of
the producer and the limitations on the interest of the retailer when he
said: "Ownership of the goods does not carry the right to sell them
with a specific mark."' 4  It is clear that under our laws of trademarks
and unfair competition any act of a retailer or competitor which damages
a trademark or the good will it symbolizes constitutes grounds for re-
covery. 5 It often is said that price-cutters use the good will of consumer
goods producers to their own advantage. They contribute nothing to the
creation of the good will, and the reputation of the producer is used as
"bait" to create the impression that everything is an equal bargain.
Price-cutting is one of the oldest devices used to create a monopoly. 6
Retailers must earn a reasonable profit to stay in business. When a com-
petitor begins to cut prices, other retailers must also cut prices. The re-
suilt is often twofold: either profit is lost and/or the sale of the good must
be discontinued. Thus, a producer's market is confined to a few giant
outlets which are willing to either absorb loss of profits or can dispose of
one particular line of goods for promotional purposes. This usually is
accomplished at an unrealistically low rate of profit. As time passes, a
small number of outlets will assume control of the market and are then
in a position to set their own rate of profit. In the final analysis, this
cycle will work to the long-run detriment of the public. Furthermore,
the producer of an item requiring widespread circulation is directly in-
jured because he will not sell as many items through a few large outlets
as he will through many small outlets.
EVOLUTION OF THE OHIO FAIR TRADE ACT
Fair trade legislation throughout the United States evolved during the
early nineteen thirties. It was a response to the particularly predatory
price-cutting practices prevalent during that period.'7 As a part of this
13. 96 U.S. 245, 252 (1877).
14. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 692 (1923).
15. See, e.g., Hugo Stein Cloak Co. v. S. B. Stein & Son, 58 Ohio App. 377, 16 N.E.2d 609
(1937).
16. Compare Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910), with United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1910).
17. 2 TRADE REG. REP. 5 6041 (1963) contains a tabulation and reference to the fair
trade laws enacted in the various states and an up-to-date designation of whether the courts
in those states have held the law constitutional, constitutional in part, or unconstitutional.
[Vol 15:84
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movement, Ohio enacted fair trade legislation in 1936. This law was
applied throughout the state with little controversy until 1958. Then,
in the case of Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc.,8 the
Ohio Supreme Court found the 1936 act unconstitutional insofar as it
bound non-signers of fair trade contracts. The decision indicated that the
"non-signer" clause of the 1936 act involved a delegation of legislative
authority, abuse of the police power, and violation of the due process
clause. Unfortunately, the court was silent with respect to the way in
which these various constitutional evils arose. Accordingly, subsequent
courts and the legislature were left without true guideposts as to what
could and could not be done in enacting and enforcing constitutional fair
trade legislation.
It must be understood at this point that to be effective, fair trade leg-
islation must reach two classes of retailers: those who will sign agree-
ments with the manufacturers of branded merchandise, and those who
desire to deal in such manufacturer's merchandise and utilize the manu-
facturer's trademarks and trade names, but who have not signed and will
not sign written fair trade agreements. It is this second objective of the
law which has bothered the courts and created constitutional problems in
the view of certain state tribunals. In all but five states, 9 the courts
have refused to find unconstitutional those portions of the law which
permit manufacturers and retailers to sign written fair trade contracts."0
Many courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have found
that even the non-signer provisions of the various state fair trade laws do
not violate any constitutional provision.2 The United States Supreme
Court's decision stands to this day as a model of the type of decision and
reasoning which supports the validity of the "old-type" fair trade legisla-
tion, including the non-signer provision. In fact, until the Ohio and
Michigan decisions on fair trade, all of the so-called "big-market" states
and most of the courts generally considered by lawyers to be "strong"
courts had found fair trade legislation to be valid even as to non-signers.
These included courts in the states of California, Illinois, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania.
Subsequent to the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling in the Bargain Fair
case, the Ohio General Assembly was forced to determine (1) whether
or not a need still existed for fair trade legislation, and (2) whether, as a
practical matter, any effective similar legislation could be enacted in view
18. 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 N.E.2d 481 (1958).
19. The states are Alabama, Montana, Nebraska, Utah, and Wyoming. None of these juris-
dictions, it will be noted, is a so-called "big market" state.
20. See the decision in Ohio in the Bargain Fair case, where the court invalidated the non-
signer provisions of the 1936 Fair Trade Act, but cast no question upon the constitutional
validity of the contract provisions of the act.
21. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
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of the Bargain Fair holding. Affirmative answers to both questions re-
sulted in the enactment of the 1959 Fair Trade Act. Significant to the
analysis of what the legislature did in enacting the 1959 Fair Trade Act
are the following propositions which are directly attributable to an
analysis of what the Bargain Fair decision held and, perhaps more im-
portant, what it did not hold.
First, the Ohio Supreme Court did not hold all fair trade legislation
unlawful per se. The court's objection was limited to the non-signer pro-
vision of the 1936 act. It held that the non-signer provision permitted a
manufacturer to arbitrarily establish a resale price which by legislative
fiat became the legal resale price throughout the state. This was true
whether or not the retailer had acquired the goods with knowledge of
the price, had in any way indicated his assent expressly, or by act or word
had agreed to the conditions attached to his use of the manufacturer's
trademark in reselling the goods. The court thus concluded that the non-
signer clause was an unauthorized delegation of legislative power to the
manufacturer. This objection would vanish, however, if the retailer were
given advance notice of a manufacturer's minimum prices and a choice
in deciding whether he desired to utilize the trademarks and trade names
of manufacturers who elected to take advantage of the Fair Trade Act.
Second, the court did not invalidate the provisions of the former act
which permitted the manufacturer and retailer to stipulate minimum
prices by agreement. Thus, the legislature reasoned that the court's ob-
jections to the prior Fair Trade Act (or at least to the non-signer provi-
sion) would be overcome if the act were made applicable to all parties
on a voluntary or consensual basis, whether that basis was the result of
the acts of the parties themselves or of express agreements between the
parties.
Third, the court found that a property interest did in fact exist in a
trademark, and then held that the attempted protection of that property
interest through the "non-signer" clause device unfairly infringed on the
seller's property interest in the trademarked commodity.
In enacting the 1959 Fair Trade Act, the legislature accepted a prin-
ciple stated by the Supreme Court of the United States:
There is a great body of fact and opinion tending to show that price
cutting by retail dealers is not only injurious to the good will and
business of the producer and distributor of identified goods, but in-
jurious to the general public as well. 2
The Court recognized that
good will is property in a very real sense, injury to which, like injury
to any other species of property, is a proper subject for legislation.
Good will is a valuable contributing aid to business - sometimes the
22. Id. at 195.
[Vol 15:84
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most valuable contributing asset of the producer [manufacturer] or
distributor [retailer] of commodities. And distinctive trademarks,
labels and brands, are legitimate aids to the creation or enlargement
of such good will- It is well-settled that the proprietor of the good
will "is entitled to protection as against one who attempts to deprive
him of the benefits resulting from the same, by using his labels and
tre-mark without his consent and authority."23
Furthermore, the legislature stated:
A Proprietor shall retain a proprietary interest in any commodity with
respect to which he is a proprietor after he has sold it to distributors,
so long as such commodity continues to be identified by his trade-mark
or trade name, by reason of his interest in stimulating demand for such
commodity through effective distribution to ultimate consumers and of
his interest in continuing protection of the good will associated with
his trade-mark or trade name.24
The Court recognized the legislative fiat that the "ownership of the goods
does not carry the right [by the retailer] to sell them with a specific
mark."
25
With these fundamentals of trademark law and economics before it
and defined by it, the legislature attempted to find a way to protect trade-
marks, good will, and small business and to prevent the concentrated sale
of branded commodities in a small number of large retail outlets.
In the Bargain Fair case, the Ohio Supreme Court did not question
the right of a trademark owner to enter into contracts with distributors
of the goods bearing his mark to establish minimum prices for the resale
of such goods. And there was no suggestion that a statute permitting the
exercise of such a right was in conflict with the Ohio Constitution.
Relying on fundamental principles of contract law, the legislature
in the new Fair Trade Act defined a "contract" as "any agreement, writ-
ten or verbal, or arising from the acts of parties."26  The proprietor of
branded commodities is authorized to establish minimum prices for their
resale. Anyone who purchases goods with knowledge of the established
resale price enters into a contract with the proprietor not to sell the
goods for less than the established prices while using the proprietor's
trademark. Therefore, by the employment of the elementary principles
of offer and acceptance, the legislature has provided that a retailer
enters into a contract with a proprietor when he purchases goods bearing
the proprietor's trademark with knowledge that the proprietor has estab-
lished resale prices for his goods. The proprietor thus establishes mini-
mum resale prices as a condition for the use of his good will as an aid in
the resale.
23. Id. at 194-95. (Citing McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 252 (1877).)
24. OHIo REy. CODE 5 1333.31.
25. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 692 (1923).
26. Oio Ruv. CODE § 1333.28(I).
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The issue may be further narrowed: Is a statute unconstitutional
if the contracts it authorizes are based on the principle of offer and
acceptance arising from the acts of the parties? The legislature believed
to the contrary.
After thorough debate and full consideration of all data presented
relating to both the economic and constitutional questions, the House
Judiciary Committee reported the present fair trade bill without a single
dissenting vote. This bill was passed by the House with only four nega-
tive votes. The bill was then referred to the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, where it was recommended for passage without a single dissent-
ing vote. The Senate as a whole adopted the bill with only two negative
votes.
Governor DiSalle, in accordance with his prerogative, vetoed the
law on policy grounds. Nevertheless, the Democratically-controlled
House of Representatives repassed the bill by a vote of thirty to three.
To assure that no mistake or misinterpretation would be made, the
legislature took pains to include in the new act a purpose clause, section
1333.27 of the Ohio Revised Code, in which it spelled out its findings
and those specific considerations which prompted the enactment of the
new Fair Trade Act as follows:
[1.] [T]o protect and preserve small business,
[2.] [T]o safeguard the good will of trademarks and trade names,
[3.] [T]o further wholesome competition [and] . . . prevent mo-
nopoly in the distribution of goods, and
[4.] [T]o promote the public welfare by securing wider distribution
of commodities and an increase in the production thereof, and
thereby reducing production and distribution costs, protecting
and increasing gainful employment in manufacturing, whole-
saling and retailing, all for the benefit of the consumer and the
well-being of the citizens of the state.
[5.] To remove obstructions to the marketing of identified merchan-
dise in commerce which are occasioned by unfair selling prac-
tices ....
The legislative hearings from which the purposes embodied in the
new Fair Trade Act were drawn included evidence from which the
legislature drew the following conclusions:
1. Competition is not restrained by the new Fair Trade Act among
producers of rival articles who will seek to make their prices as com-
petitive as possible, but only among dealers selling the same article.
That is, any limitation on competition relates only to intra-brand and
not inter-brand competition. The Ohio Fair Trade Act operates only
in instances where the product involved is in free and open competition
with other commodities of the same general class in the same market
area. In effect, the producer is seeking only to avoid competing with
[Vol 15:84
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himself. Another manufacturer is free to undersell the producer and
thus give the public an open market. Prices will therefore be kept
down by competition between manufacturers and by the freedom of
the public to refrain from buying an article if it is too expensive.
2. The consumer is not affected any differently through retail price
maintenance contracts than if the manufacturer sold to them directly
through his own local chains, as is the case with many large concerns
such as A & P, Sears, Woolworth, etc. These manufacturers themselves
control their own system of distribution.
3. The stability of the manufacturer's marketing organization and
system of distribution is lost when some retailers start price-cutting.
Such practice threatens the reasonable profit of others, who then will
refuse to handle the price-cut article. This results in lower distribution
of the manufacturer's products, which deprives both the manufacturer
and the public of the benefits of mass production.
4. Price-cutting on well-known products often deceives the public
and lures customers into a store where they may be induced to buy
unknown, unbranded articles at an unreasonably high price. In this
instance, both the manufacturer of the standardized article and the
general public are losers.
5. A controlled system of distribution and minimum retail price
maintenance operate as combatants to inflation by deterring price in-
creases in two ways:
(a) Price increases by unscrupulous retailers who could take
such action if the prices on branded commodities were not standard-
ized and generally well known are prevented;
(b) The manufacturer will be reluctant to raise his prices
where he must do so generally and thus be subject to the competi-
tion of rival manufacturers.
6. The reputation of a trade name in which the manufacturer may
have a substantial investment and which may be the manufacturer's
most valuable asset will suffer if the product sold in connection with
such a trade name is priced indiscriminately by various retailers and
dumped on their bargain counters.
7. Price warfare among competing retailers selling a manufacturer's
commodity will result in the strongest retail organization driving the
smaller independent retailers out of the market. The evils of this
tendency toward monopoly affect not only those eliminated but also the
welfare of the public generally. For in the long run, monopolistic
conditions do not result in lower prices. Every independent business
which fails as a result of price warfare lessens the vigor of the overall
economy.
1963]
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8. Emphasis placed by competing retailers on selling the same
product at a price below that of other retailers (even perhaps below
cost) discourages the retailer from providing necessary services in con-
nection with the sale of the products."
The new contract concept embodied in the Ohio Fair Trade Act
of 1959 was also the basis for similar legislation enacted in Virginia.
The Virginia legislation was tested and found constitutional by the
supreme court of that state.28 As in Ohio, previous Virginia fair trade
legislation had been held invalid. Virginia and Ohio, however, are the
only states which have adopted a contract concept to replace the non-
signer provision, although the non-signer provisions were the backbone
of the predecessor fair trade laws in each of those states, as well as the
fair trade legislation existing in other states throughout the country.
WHAT FAIR TRADE ACCOMPLISHES
In essence, the new Ohio Fair Trade Act provides that where trade-
marked products are in free and open competition with other com-
modities produced for sale at retail, the owner of the trademark or brand
name applied to such commodities may condition the use of such trade-
mark or brand name. This can be accomplished by requiring that any
retailer who desires to acquire and sell such commodities at retail with
the use of that trademark or brand name must sell said products for
at least the minimum prices stipulated by the owner of the trademark
or brand name. The retailer is not required to utilize a trademark
owner's brand or name if he objects to such condition. In addition, no
retailer can be bound by the provisions of the Ohio Fair Trade Act
unless he has had notice of the conditions on the use of a given brand
or name at the time he acquires the commodities. The legislature has
expressed an intention that the Fair Trade Act will have no operative
effect unless the merchandise in question is in free and open competition
with other commodities of the same class.29
27. A complete transcript of the legislative hearings was before the court of appeals and the
Ohio Supreme Court in Brief for Appellee, p. 9, Hudson Distribs., Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 174
Ohio St. 487, 190 N.E.2d 460 (1963).
28. General Elec. Co. v. Standard Drug Co., 202 Va. 367, 117 S.E.2d 289 (1960), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 4 (1961).
29. This merely gives the owner of a trademark or trade name the same control over his
system of distribution as is now exercised by certain large commercial establishments, such as
oil companies, groceries, and department stores that control their own systems of distribution
from the manufacturing through the retail level. Thus the law says that the Bulova Watch
Company, for example, may preclude price-cutting competition between various retail outlets
of Bulova watches, but there can be no abatement of the competition between Bulova watches,
Elgin watches, Hamilton watches, etc.
[Vol. 15:84
Gorrell & Brown, Fair Trade Legislation
THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE CONCEPT
EMBODIED IN THE NEW OHIO FAIR TRADE ACT
It is dear that, even under the supreme court's holding in the
Bargain Fair case, a written contract between manufacturer and retailer
designed to establish minimum resale prices for a manufacturer's trade-
marked commodities is valid. The legislature has now provided that a
contract also may exist where the manufacturer or trademark owner
gives notice of its minimum retail prices to the retailer. If such a re-
tailer thereafter decides to acquire the manufacturer's commodities bear-
ing his trademark and to use that trademark in the sale of such com-
modities, a contract will exist. The legislature found that the only
difference between the "consent" and "in fact" situations is that in the
former, a written contract between the parties exists, while in the latter,
a contract arises by reason of the acts of the parties. The legislature
further recognized that nothing new nor novel occurs in the establish-
ment of a contract arising out of their acts between certain parties.
If a person owns a piece of property, for example an apple, he
may enter into an agreement with another person to sell that apple
for five cents. A binding contract arises and the purchaser is obligated
to pay the seller five cents. The seller also may place a sign on his
apple saying, "For Sale - 5 cents." If another person then comes along,
reads the notice, and takes and eats the apple, he is equally obligated
to pay the seller five cents. This result follows even if the apple eater
says to himself while munching the apple, "I intend to pay only three
cents." The principle is the same whether the property interest trans-
ferred is an apple, a house, an exclusive franchise or license, or a trade-
mark or trade name.
The Ohio legislature in 1959 simply defined another way in which
parties may enter into fair trade contracts. This method was in addition
to written agreements, the validity of which were not questioned in
the Bargain Fair case. However, out of an abundance of caution, the
legislature went fiurther. The discounter was given additional safe-
guards which ordinarily do not appear in a contractual relationship. The
legislature provided that a retailer might escape from the contract if he
later regretted his bargain, even though he had decided to acquire a com-
modity having a given brand name with full knowledge of the condi-
tion on its use of that brand name. To accomplish such rescission, the
retailer can sell the commodity back to the manufacturer at the invoice
price. In addition, the legislature has provided that if the retailer de-
cides not to take advantage of the manufacturer's trade name to assist
him in reselling the goods, he may sell the commodity qua commodity
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at any price he chooses.' In the apple analogy, the purchaser does
not have these privileges.
The problem which really has faced the courts and legislatures has
been to determine the proper allocation of competing property rights
and interests under the fair trade acts. Both the interest of the manu-
facturer in his trademark or trade name and the interest in the com-
modity itself must be considered. The Supreme Court of Ohio held, and
some others have agreed, that the non-signer clause weighed in favor of
the property rights of the trademark owners to the prejudice of certain
property rights in the commodity itself to the extent that constitutional
rights surrounding the latter were violated.
The new Ohio legislation, together with the new Virginia act, estab-
lished a new concept in the area of retail price maintenance - an area
of expanding economic significance as giant discount organizations
loom ever larger in the market place.3 To an increasing extent, these
organizations threaten the economic survival of the independent mer-
chant and distribution systems which need independent merchants as an
integral part of their economy. The new concept strikes a balance
between the competing proprietary interests. It still permits the owner
of a trademark or trade name to set the price or conditions on the use
of that mark or name, just as the owner of any other piece of property
may state its price. However, it prevents the owner of a commodity
from being arbitrarily forced to accept that price or those conditions
by (1) giving him a choice through notice of the conditions before he
becomes bound by them, and (2) allowing him to break the relation-
ship with the trademark owner without economic loss, even after he has
made such an election.
When the Hudson Distributors case and the new Ohio Fair Trade
Act are analyzed on the basis of the property interest in a trademark or
trade name, the constitutional arguments that plagued the old non-signer
clause dissolve. The legislature had ample precedent for the imposition
of a contractual relationship arising out of the acts of the parties as de-
fined in the Fair Trade Act." In Ohio, the General Assembly was
30. OHio REV. CODE § 1333.33.
31. Hudson Distributors is a part of a large chain of retail and wholesale drugstores oper-
ating in Michigan and Ohio.
32. The commercial statutes of Ohio contain ample precedent which would justify the legis-
lature's conferring of covenants, warranties, and contractual burdens by law in situations in
which a transfer of personal property occurs. Indeed, such authority existed in Ohio's versions
of the Uniform Sales Act, Conditional Sales Act, Mechanic's Lien Laws, Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, Trust Receipts law, and Warehouse Receipts Act. These laws were replaced
by the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code on July 1, 1962. Nevertheless, the same
principles under examination in this article have been carried forth and, it is submitted, still
prevail.
Specifically, the burdens and obligations imposed upon transferors of personal property
can be found in §§ 1302.27-.30 of the Ohio Revised Code. These sections impose a warranty
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aided by an express provision of the Ohio Constitution which it felt
authorized passage of such legislation.3
FAIR TRADE IN OHIO
SUBSEQUENT TO THE 1959 ACT
Subsequent to the enactment of the new Fair Trade Act, injunctions
were granted readily in suits brought by trade name owners in Franklin
County, Montgomery County, and in isolated instances in other parts of
of fitness for a specific purpose and of merchantability as an implied condition of the sale
itself. This occurs without regard to whether such a condition is incorporated into the sales
contract between the parties. Instead, the burdens imposed arise from the fact that a sale oc-
curred, not because the parties voluntarily agreed to such terms.
Similarly, the transfer or assignment in bulk of a part or entire stock of merchandise also
creates burdens and obligations by statute. See OHIO REv. CODE §§ 1306.01-.08.
Section 1311.09 of the Revised Code affords remedial rights to parties involved in material
improvements contracts. The rights afforded extend not only to the contracting parties, but
also to subcontractors, materialmen, laborers, and those who have no contractual relationship
with the original parties. These provisions, in their previous form, were attacked on con-
stitutional grounds in Theatre Co. v. Hooper, 123 Ohio St. 322, 175 N.E. 450 (1931). The
court, however, rejected the attack and upheld the statute's validity.
The impositions of contractual burdens and obligations by reason of prescribed acts or
conduct are most commonly found in the law of commercial transactions. Obviously, these
well-known principles are essential to the preservation of practical commercial relationships.
Still, such obligations are not limited to this particular area of law.
For example, the Ohio General Assembly defined a contractual relationship in a "non-
commercial" area. See OmIo REV. CODE § 3319.11, which establishes a school teacher's con-
tract based solely on the acts of the parties. This section and its predecessor caused con-
siderable litigation, but the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld its provisions. See Jacot v.
Secrest, 153 Ohio St. 553, 93 N.E.2d 1 (1950); State ex rel. Foster v. Madison Township
Bd. of Educ., 151 Ohio St. 413, 86 N.E.2d 598 (1949); State ex rel. Rutherford v. Barberton
Bd. of Educ., 148 Ohio St. 242, 74 N.E.2d 246 (1947).
33. The General Assembly, in § 1333.27 (A) of the Revised Code, specifically pointed
out that, inter alia, it was acting "in pursuance of the power specifically granted the General
Assembly by the people in Section 2, Article XIII of the Ohio Constitution, to regulate the
sale and conveyance of personal property."
If the Ohio Fair Trade Act purports to do anything other than protect the proprietary
rights of the owner of a trademark or trade name from the abuse of those rights by others, it
certainly does nothing beyond prescribing the manner in which persons may sell and convey
their personal property. Moreover, an examination of the legal arguments against this law
indicates that they amount to the complaint that this legislation seeks to interfere with what
is claimed as a person's completely uninhibited and unrestricted constitutional right to sell
and convey his personal property, irrespective of the effect upon or the rights of others.
Even if the statute did go as far as claimed, it is submitted that the General Assembly has
the express constitutional right to impose restrictions of the kind which opponents of the new
Fair Trade Act claim are imposed. In 1912, the Ohio Constitution of 1851 was amended to
include article XII, section 2, to which the General Assembly referred and which reads:
"Laws may be passed regulating the sale and conveyance of other personal property,
whether owned by a corporation, joint stock company or individual."
The immediate motivation for this amendment was that the supreme court in Miller v.
Crawford, 70 Ohio St. 207, 71 N.E. 631 (1904) and Williams & Thomas Co. v. Preslo, 84
Ohio St. 328, 95 N.E. 900 (1911) declared a bulk sales law passed by the legislature uncon-
stitutional on the ground that such a law constituted an unwarranted restriction upon the
rights of the individual to acquire and possess property and contained a forbidden discrimina-
tion in favor of a limited class of creditors. The constitution was then amended by the in-
clusion of article XIII, section 2, quoted above, and thereafter the General Assembly re-en-
acted another bulk sales law. Subsequently, the supreme court agreed that the purpose of
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the state. Prior to the effective date of the new Fair Trade Act, Hudson
Distributors, Inc., part of a giant interstate discounting drug chain,
commenced a declaratory judgment action in the Common Pleas Court
of Cuyahoga County to test whether the new Fair Trade Act had over-
come the constitutional infirmities found by the supreme court in the
1936 act. The parties in that case, which ultimately became the test
case decided by the supreme court, proceeded to build a large and
complete record. This compilation contained the complete legislative
hearings as well as a full panorama of economic and legal arguments
pertaining to fair trade legislation.
While there were other lower court holdings with respect to the
constitutionality of the new Fair Trade Act,34 it generally was conceded
that the cases in which the constitutionality of the new Fair Trade Act
would be tested were the declaratory judgment actions commenced by
Hudson Distributors, Inc. against The Upjohn Company and Eli Lilly & Co.
in Cleveland. In those cases, the law initially was held unconstitutional
in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County. On appeal, the de-
cision was reversed and the constitutionality of the new act affirmed.
The supreme court then accepted a motion to certify filed by Hudson
Distributors, Inc. and received extensive briefs from all of the parties
to that litigation. Briefs also were submitted by interested groups
throughout the state who appeared before the court as amicus curiae.
In its struggle to reach a decision, the court twice heard oral argument
on the merits pertaining to the constitutional questions before it. The
supreme court then affirmed the decision in the court of appeals below
and thereby held that the new Fair Trade Act was constitutional. But it
did not succeed in completely validating the new Ohio legislation be-
cause the opinion was by a minority of the seven-judge court."u
this amendment was to amend the Bill of Rights and give the General Assembly power to
regulate the sale and conveyance of personal property, regardless of any other provision of the
Bill of Rights which might otherwise invalidate legislation in this area. Thereafter, the court
upheld the constitutionality of the new bulk sales law in Steele, Hopkins & Meredith Co. v.
Miller, 92 Ohio St. 115, 123, 110 N.E. 648 (1915).
34. See Judge Gusweiler's opinion in Helena Rubinstein, Inc. v. Cincinnati Vitamin &
Cosmetic Distribs. Co., 167 N.E.2d 687 (Ohio C.P. 1960), holding the Fair Trade Act un-
constitutional, and the opinions of Judge Leach and the Franklin County Court of Appeals in
the case of Mead Johnson & Co. v. Columbus Vitamin & Cosmetic Distrib. Inc., TRADE REG.
REP. (1962 Trade Cas.) 9 70360 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962), appeal dismissed, 174 Ohio St. 486
(1962). (Consolidated with Corning Glassworks, Inc. v. Ontario Store of Columbus, Inc.,
among others.)
35. The Ohio constitutional provision requiring six votes to declare a law unconstitutional
has been tested and found valid by the United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Akron Park
Dist., 281 U.S. 74 (1929).
The history and purpose behind the Ohio constitutional limitations upon the supreme
court in declaring the laws of this state unconstitutional are outlined in Michaelson v. City
of Cincinnati, 27 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 100 (C.P. 1928): "For a number of years prior to the
adoption of the constitution in 1912, there was a great deal of discussion and some severe
criticism of the right of courts to declare acts of legislative bodies unconstitutional and void.
At one time this criticism went to the extent of advocating the recall of judicial decisions.
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The controlling opinion of the supreme court was a well-reasoned,
lengthy discussion of the principles involved. The "majority" opinion,
however, unfortunately was limited to two paragraphs with no state-
ment of the legal rationale or reasoning which led to their conclusion.
It can be said that if the judges of the supreme court strike down a piece
of legislation involving so much thought and effort by the General
Assembly, at the least the court owes the General Assembly the courtesy
of explicitly stating the reasons for their feeling that the legislature has
gone astray on constitutional principles. The so-called "majority opinion"
did not deign to do this.
DEVELOPMENTS SUBSEQUENT TO
THE OHIO SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING**
The first litigation subsequent to the supreme court's holding in the
Upjohn case took place in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga
County. This involved a counterclaim filed by Eli Lilly & Co. in the
declaratory judgment action commenced against that company by Hud-
son Distributors, Inc.3 In that case, Judge Gerald Baynes of the Com-
mon Pleas Court of Madison County, sitting by designation in Cuyahoga
County, found that the discounter was in violation of Eli Lilly's rights
under the new Fair Trade Act. Accordingly, the court granted an in-
junction prohibiting the discounter from further violations of the Fair
Trade Act.
The new Ohio Fair Trade Act, however, also provides under Section
1333.32(b) (3) of the Ohio Revised Code that any person suffering
damage by reason of a violation of the Fair Trade Act is entitled to
recover the costs of suit "including reasonable attorneys' fees." This
provision becomes truly significant in light of Judge Baynes' decision.
Obviously, a substantial amount of attorneys' fees was involved in the
representation of Eli Lilly, for the case went through the Supreme Court
of Ohio. Hudson Distributors thus found itself legally bound to pay
an award of $38,100 in attorneys' fees to Eli Lilly. Counsel throughout
the State of Ohio would do well to bear this in mind when advising
clients on the merits of contesting actions commenced under the new
Fair Trade Act.
The ultimate future of the new Fair Trade Act in Ohio has not yet
The constitutional convention in 1912 by Article 4, Section 2, which section was later ratified
by the people of this state, placed a check upon the power of the courts of this state to declare
acts unconstitutional and void. If this court was to follow the opinion of the majority of the
judges rather than the judgment of the court, it would be doing by indirection that which
the Constitution prohibits being directly done." See also Board of Educ. v. Wellston, 43
Ohio App. 552, 184 NE. 28 (1932).
36. Hudson Distribs. Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 730,118, Ohio C.P. Aug. 7, 1963 (Cuya-
hoga County declaratory judgment action).
** See Addenda for current developments in the Lilly and Uoiohn cases.
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been settled in the courts. Presently, cases seeking relief under the
Fair Trade Act are pending in the Federal District Court in Columbus,
as well as in the Common Pleas Courts of Clark, Cuyahoga, Lucas, and
Mahoning Counties. Perhaps the federal courts will be the key to the
future course which fair trade enforcement will take in Ohio. Judge
Carl F. Weinman of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio (Western Division) granted a temporary injunction
even prior to the supreme court's ruling in the Upjohn case. The dis-
counter in that case took an appeal to the United States Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, which affirmed Judge Weinman's holding." Be-
cause the Ohio Supreme Court has now affirmed the constitutionality of
the Fair Trade Act, and since the federal courts are bound to follow the
substantive law of the state involved, it would seem dear that any manu-
facturer should be able to secure redress for a violation of his rights
under the new Ohio Fair Trade Act in the federal courts. Of course,
the requisite diversity of citizenship must exist between the manufacturer
and the offending retailer.
An analysis of the Ohio Constitution and of case precedents leads
to the conclusion that judicial respect for the provisions of article IV,
section 2 of the Ohio Constitution requires similar enforcement of the
Fair Trade Act by the various common pleas courts throughout the
State of Ohio. There exists, however, the possibility that any case com-
menced in the state court may reach a court of appeals which may be
tempted to disregard the constitutional provision and strike down the
new Fair Trade Act. For the lower courts now will feel confident that
such action would receive the favorable support of the four dissenting
supreme court judges in the Upjohn case.
CONCLUSION
As a result of the recent Ohio and Virginia decisions, it appears that
the long and turbulent history of fair trade legislation in this country
may be at another turning point. A basic concern to all courts consider-
ing the cases arising in this field has been one of fairness, both to the
proprietary interest of the trademark owner and to the interest of the
retailer in selling merchandise purchased by the retailer at a price of the
retailer's own choosing. The new contract concept of the Ohio Fair
Trade Act strikes a balance that apparently affords fair protection to
both the manufacturer and the retailer. The manufacturer's proprietary
interest can be protected if he complies fully with the provisions of the
new Fair Trade Act. The retailer also is protected because he cannot be
37. Miles Labs., Inc. v. Dayton Vitamin & Cosmetic Distribs., Inc., 292 F.2d 59 (6th Cit.
1961).
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required to impose any particular price for a commodity, unless his will-
ingness to be bound by a contractual agreement is first indicated through
his act of acquiring the commodity in question with notice of the con-
ditions attendant to the use of the trademark affixed to that commodity.
While it is unfortunate that the Supreme Court of Ohio was not
able to lay the matter completely at rest by a majority affirmance of
the finding of the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals, the opinion of
the court in the Upjohn case joins with the Standard Drug case in Vir-
ginia in validating the laws in the only two states embodying the
new contract concept as the basis for fair trade legislation. This new
concept of fair trade legislation seems to be satisfactory and may well
afford the solution that legislators in the other states are seeking to meet
the problems presented by the ever expanding, predatory, price-cutting
discounters that are flooding the American market scene.
ADDENDA
Since preparation of this article,
on August 22, 1963, the Ohio Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga
County, Cohen, Judge, vacated and set aside the decision rendered by
Judge Baynes and assigned the cause for retrial on allegations by
the attorney for the plaintiff, Hudson Distributors, Inc., that Judge
Baynes had a direct interest in a non-discounting retail store located
fifteen miles from Columbus Vitamin & Cosmetic Distributors, Inc.,
a sister corporation of Hudson Distributors, Inc-38
This commonpleas decision is now being appealed.
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has granted review
of the appeals in Hudson Distribs., Inc. v. Upjohn Co. 9 and Hudson
Distribs., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.4" The outcome of these appeals, of
course, is open to conjecture.
38. Hudson Distribs., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Gas.) 5 70871
(Ohio C.P. 1963). See text at note 36 supra.
39. 32 U.S.L. Week 3210 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1963) (No. 489).
40. Id. (No. 490).
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